Answer all of the following questions below in a 10-12 page paper. The paper should be double-spaced, in 12-point font, and should have page numbers. Do not write more than 12 pages, as I will stop reading at the end of the twelfth page. Your paper will lose 5 points per day that it is late UNLESS your dean contacts me to request that you receive an extension. Anything more than a very small number of spelling or grammatical errors will result in points being deducted from your final grade, so proofread carefully.

FULL FOOTNOTES ARE REQUIRED FOR YOUR SOURCES, even if they are assigned reading. A full footnote looks like the Nakash and Zubaida citations on the next page. These can be either in footnotes at the bottom of the page or in a bibliography at the end. You can answer the questions below by identifying them by number – 1), 2), 3) without an overarching introduction or conclusion paragraph at the beginning and end of the paper.

You need to submit TWO copies of your paper – one as an e-mail attachment to vlangohr@yahoo.com, and one hard copy. Your name should not appear anywhere on the paper EXCEPT on a title page which should be THE FINAL PAGE of the paper.

ANSWER ALL OF THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS.

1) As we saw in the 2006-7 “civil war” period in Iraq, the greatest violence in post-2003 Iraq was between Arab Sunnis (as opposed to Kurds, who are almost exclusively Sunni) and Shi’a. In the first decades of Iraqi history (from independence in 1920-1940), how would you describe the level of Shi’a participation and their position in Iraqi politics when compared to Arab Sunnis? Make sure to address EACH of the following:

- Considering that Shi’a make up about 60% of the Iraqi population, does it appear that Shi’a were proportionately represented in the Iraqi legislature, or were there fewer Shi’a in elected office than we would expect given their numbers?

- Did Shi’a enjoy the same access as Arab Sunnis to government jobs?

- In the 1930s and 1940s several political parties emerged in Iraq. Did Arab Sunnis and Shi’a tend to join the same political parties; if not, why did particular parties appeal primarily either to Arab Sunnis or to Shi’a?

- In the first decades after independence, do we find evidence of Arab Sunnis and Shi’a joining on the same side in political or social activity other than political party membership (for example, demonstrations, protests, social clubs, etc.?)
Sources: Class lectures, the selections from Anderson and Stansfield’s *The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division* on the syllabus, and:


2) How different are Shi’a, Arab Sunnis, and Kurds in a) their experiences between 2003-8, and b) their attitudes about and preferences for Iraqi politics? Make sure to answer both parts of the question. (a) includes things like access to basic necessities like food, water, electricity, and safety from violence, murder, or kidnapping. Could we argue that differences or similarities in a) account for differences or similarities in b)? (NO MORE THAN FOUR PAGES).

**Sources**

- USA Today Poll 2004 on Government Preferences (ER)

- Fifth Anniversary Poll, Answers to Questions (ER). These are in a ER packet called “Iraq Polls and Survey Data.” The first several pages of this packet are called “Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis;” don’t use these. Scroll through this section until you get to the first page titled “5th Anniversary Poll” and use that first page and the pages of poll data after.

The USA Today poll breaks down Iraqi preferences for and expectations about their new political system by group. The Fifth Anniversary polls below break down Iraqis’ post-war experiences, attitudes, level of optimism or pessimism about the future, and preference for the future shape of Iraq by province; on the final page of this paper assignment, you will see the 18 provinces of Iraq divided into majority Shi’a, Arab Sunni, or Kurdish provinces, or mixed (Baghdad). The best way to compare Sunni, Kurd, and Shi’a here is to 1) figure out which provinces are majority Sunni, Shi’a, and Kurd, and 2) compute the average of the indicator (like access to electricity) for each of the Sunni, Shi’a, and Kurdish provinces.

NOTE: At the end of each question in the polls, after the breakdown by province, you will see a breakdown by “Arab,” “Kurd,” “Sunni” and “Shia.”
DO NOT USE THESE FOR YOUR AVERAGE FIGURES, because “Arab” includes both Sunni and Shi’a, “Sunni” includes both Arab Sunnis and Kurds, and “Shia” includes mostly the Arab Shi’a but also the small number of Kurdish “Shi’a.

3) Now that you know something about Arab Sunni-Shi’a relations in the first decades of independent Iraqi history, and you know from the polls about the experiences and preferences of these groups and Kurds in 2004 and 2008, (how) do you think sectarianism is likely to manifest itself in Iraqi politics in the next one to two years? Write a 2-3 page report on an ongoing example of ONE OF THE FOLLOWING between 2007-9: (NO MORE THAN THREE PAGES):

- “Sectarian violence” - a group of Arab Sunni, Shi’a, or Kurds using violence against another group based on their ethnic/religious affiliation.
- “Sectarian political identification” - the extent to which people in any of these groups automatically vote either for a political party which explicitly represents only their own group, or a party whose platform calls explicitly for policies which would only or primarily benefit their own group.
- “Sectarian political issues” – a key issue in current Iraq on which views and policies are divided along clearly sectarian lines, with, for example, Arab Shi’a taking a particular position on an actual issue, like the oil law, that is opposed to that of Iraqi Kurds.

You need to:

a) Clearly define the issue you have chosen, with relevant dates and background.

b) Identify the positions/actions that the group in question has taken/is taking.

c) Explain why this particular issue is relevant to the success of democracy and stability in Iraq.

d) Explain whether and how you think this problem is likely to be resolved (peacefully or otherwise) in the next five years? Why?

You need to use at least 3-4 sources for your answer. For example, it is not sufficient to use as your issue, for example, disagreements between different Iraqi groups on the oil law, quote one New York Times article as your evidence, and that’s it.

In identifying your issue, you could look through New York Times articles over the last year and a half, International Crisis Group reports from their website, and articles from the journal Middle East Report, (www.merip.org, particularly articles called “Middle East Report Online” or MEROs http://www.merip.org/mero/mero.html).
4. In the article “Regime Change: The Case of Iraq,” Jan Narveson lays out five conditions which s/he says must be fulfilled in order for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 to be properly considered an instance of humanitarian invasion. In NO MORE THAN TWO PAGES, apply some of the specific information you learned in Question #2 about Iraqis’ attitudes and life experiences between 2003-8 to Narveson’s criteria and suggest whether this information supports Narveson’s categorization of the invasion as humanitarian or not. YOU ARE NOT BEING ASKED TO GIVE YOUR OWN OPINION ON WHETHER OR NOT THE INVASION QUALIFIES AS A HUMANITARIAN INVASION; YOU ALSO DON’T HAVE TO DISCUSS ALL FIVE CRITERIA WHICH NARVESON PUTS FORWARD. What you need to do is pick some specific information from the polls and show how, by one or more of Narveson’s own criteria, this information supports or undermines the argument that this was a humanitarian intervention.

Provinces by Majority

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nine Shi’ite majority provinces</th>
<th>4 Kurdish Provinces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Babil</td>
<td>Part of the KRG: Dahuk, Suleimaniyya, Irbil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wasit</td>
<td>Also K-majority: Kirkuk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maysan</td>
<td>Sunni majority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basra</td>
<td>Nineveh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhi Qar</td>
<td>Salaheddin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muthanna</td>
<td>Anbar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qadisiyyaa</td>
<td>Diyala (only about 55% Sunni, 1/3 Shia, rest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karbala</td>
<td>Kurd)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Najaf</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mixed but more Shi’a than Sunni: Baghdad (don’t put it in the column of any group)
Conditions for A Humanitarian Invasion of Iraq - Narveson


Main Question: “Is it ever just for one state to invade another in order to replace the government of the latter with an improved version?” (58). More specifically, was the Iraq war a just one in this sense?

Answer: There are five conditions necessary for humanitarian intervention. “It is not unreasonable to argue – though also very far from being beyond question – that all these conditions are met (in the 2003 invasion of Iraq)” (59).

“I shall take it as a given that the only end for which violent means are acceptable is to counter aggression….violence may be used only to counter or prevent initiated violence by others” (61).

1) “The new regime that is intended to replace the older, evil one must of course be at least a good deal better” (63).

How does he define “better”?

- “The new regime must be markedly more liberal than the old, especially in respect of the expected safety of its citizens in relation to their government” (63). Narveson says that whether the new state is democratic is not as important as whether it is liberal, which he defines as a regime which “guarantees its citizens freedoms: not only freedom from the physical violence of other privately acting individuals but freedom of religion, of association, of the press; freedom to engage in business and to choose one’s occupation rather than having it imposed by others; freedom to live more or less as we please” (64).
- He stresses “liberal” rather than “democratic” due to fears that “democracy,” defined primarily as giving people the right to vote and form governments, could lead to majority oppression of minority groups, particularly in Iraq.

2) “The costs imposed on the invaded state must somehow be acceptable to its people” (63).

- “I propose that the reasonable way to look at this question is from the point of view of the typical citizen of ….(Iraq). Would, or could, such a citizen, applaud an intervention such as this invasion, all things considered? The short answer is of course, and many Iraqis did” (66).
• “It is probably the case that scarcely a family in Iraq would not be able to
cite a cousin or brother or other close one who was either murdered or
imprisoned or tortured by Saddam’s henchmen. To be free of so terrible a
regime is surely worth appreciable risk. It is not, however, worth an
unlimited risk. The probability of the typical Iraqi’s being a victim of the
invasion must, then, be very low for such a thing to be just. The plausible
rule of thumb, I think, would be to insist that this figure be lower than the
probability of death or great loss imposed on innocents by Saddam’s
regime” (67).

He also notes (58) that many authors believe that 250,000 or more people were
killed under SH’s regime. He also says, though, that this number by itself is not
enough to justify an invasion.

• “It is not enough merely to compare civilian casualties during the invasion
with expected civilian victims of tyranny in a similar period. The main
point of…imposed regime change is to make the indefinite future very
much better for all. A modest level of civilian casualties during a short
period is balanced against a far, far lower number of victims of the state
for the indefinite future” (67).

3) “The costs to the invading state must in turn be acceptable to its people” (63).

• He discusses two kinds of costs: military lives, and tax dollars.
• On military lives, he says that since U.S. has a volunteer army, soldiers
know what they are getting into, and overwhelming U.S. military
superiority means that the risk to U.S. soldiers’ lives is about as small as is
humanly possible in a war.
• Because of this, “the question of economic cost to the U.S. taxpayer can
easily be considered as more serious. Spending a hundred billion dollars of
people’s involuntarily provided money really does need justifying in a
major way” (69).
• If a war is too costly to citizens, they will vote politicians who supported it
out of office. Bush’s re-election in 2004 proves citizens were not severely
upset by Iraq war (enough to not re-elect him as a result).

4) “The objective must be worth it to the invading state and to a just world” (63).

• In part because there are many severely oppressive regimes around the
world, and the author is not suggesting that the U.S. attempt regime
change in all of them, “there must be a suitable national interest on the
part of the invading country” (70).
• Imperialism or the desire to exploit a country are not acceptable national
interests, but “an interest in enabling (a country’s) own citizens as well as
those in the invaded country to engage in commerce and other mutually beneficial activities is indeed in the national interest” (71).

- “If there is a prospect of a genuinely liberal (or, more guarded, more nearly liberal) Iraq, then to have such a large and strategically located state joining the ranks of reasonably peaceful, forward-looking states in the modern world instead of ones harboring self-aggrandizing or fanatical dictators can only be a great good, both for the Middle East in particular and for the world more generally” (72).

5) “There must be a reasonable prospect of success for this new regime” (63).

- “This condition is perhaps the most important of all, at least from many citizens’ points of view……that proposed military action will effect change to an improved regime is a realistic possibility in the case in question: the improved regime really is likely to be substantially helped toward realization, without entailing still further serious costs over and above those cited in conditions 2 and 3” (73).

Possible Methodological Points of Disagreement

- The criteria he suggests for a legitimate humanitarian war are wrong.
- The criteria are persuasive but the indicators he suggests for measuring them are wrong.
- The criteria and measures are persuasive, but by his own measures the war turns out to be unjustifiable as a humanitarian intervention.
- What is the applicable time horizon (at what point – three years after the invasion, five years, ten years) do we measure both the “death” and “great loss,” and also the “indefinite future” during which things must be much better for the Iraqi people?