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 By
John Wiater ’75
John
Wiater ’75 writes to us from his
new post with the U.N. Mission in Kosovo.
A native of New Britain, Conn., he holds
a master’s degree in Latin American
Studies from The Elliot School of International
Affairs at George Washington University.
From 1977 through 1996, he worked for
Catholic Relief Services in Colombia,
Peru, Paraguay, Cameroon, Ethiopia
and
Guatemala. He is currently the external
assistance and programme coordinator,
assigned to the Ministry of Public
Services
at the United Nations Mission in Kosovo
(UNMIK). He and his wife, Luz Stella
Siabatto, have two daughters, Michelle
and Vanessa.
Sitting in Prishtina as a member of the United Nations’ peace-keeping
mission in Kosovo, following events in Iraq on satellite
TV or on the Internet (power outages permitting), I’m
struck by the apparent public perception of the United Nations’ inability
or unwillingness to act decisively in the cause of peace.
People are overlooking the very real presence of U.N. programs,
worldwide, in support of peace, reconciliation, nation-building,
the defense of human rights, humanitarian assistance and
economic development.
The operations of the United Nations go well beyond the
halls of the General Secretariat and the Security Council
in New York. The organization operates around the world through
an array of funds, programs and specialized agencies, as
well as peacekeeping and peace-building operations. UNICEF,
The U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the World
Food Program and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)
are among the most widely known. For over 25 years, I have
had the honor and privilege to work in close cooperation
with all of them in 10 countries of Latin America and Africa.
Within those four agencies, one would be hard-pressed to
find more drive, determination and commitment to the cause
of peace, justice, humanitarian response and development.
For five years I directed Catholic Relief Services’ (CRS)
relief and development program in Ethiopia, in the midst
of the final years of armed conflict in that country. CRS’s
program was not only the largest non-U.N. effort in that
country, but it also operated in the most war-torn provinces
of Eritrea, Tigray, Wollo and Harargue. Hundreds of thousands
of tons of food and non-food aid were distributed by CRS
to over 800,000 famine and war victims, non-stop, during
those years. We were even called upon to lead cross-battle-lines
relief operations in two northern provinces. Such a complex
and massive program would not have been possible without
the humanitarian aid coordination of the United Nations,
under the leadership of a special representative of the secretary-general.
The U.N. didn’t take over the show but did everything
necessary to keep the many wheels of a nationwide relief
operation adequately greased. U.N. leadership kept all willing
and able providers of assistance engaged, regardless of their
size. It fostered (sometimes coerced) cooperation among institutions.
It provided complex operational backstopping (port monitoring,
a massive truck transport operation and air cargo operations).
Most importantly, it provided political support before government
authorities, giving us the breathing room to concentrate
on what we did best—getting assistance deep into the
hinterland.
In Guatemala, the United Nations facilitated peace negotiations
between the government and the Guatemalan rebel alliance,
URNG. Once a comprehensive peace agreement was signed and
sealed, the U.N. set up a Verification Mission, MINUGUA,
which was mandated with the task of both monitoring compliance
with the terms of the agreement and with providing technical
assistance and financing for institutional strengthening
programs designed to enable the government to comply with
those terms—which were established to eliminate the
root causes of the conflict. My direct association with the
United Nations involved the latter mandate as liaison officer
for the Trust Fund for the Peace Process. Over $17 million
passed through the fund in support of over 60 institutional
strengthening projects in the areas of justice, public security,
indigenous rights and economic reforms. Perhaps most importantly,
MINUGUA served as a “conscience” for society. It
protected an environment that was conducive for nurturing
a fragile peace process threatened by generations of prejudice
and discrimination.
The United Nations role in Kosovo since 1999 has evolved
rapidly, from one of administering an orphaned embryonic
state, to one of establishing a Joint Interim Administration
to our present one of guiding and mentoring Provisional Institutions
of Self-Government, pending a political agreement on Kosovo’s
definitive status (vis-à-vis Serbia). Here, the United
Nations is coordinating many of the same types of institutional
strengthening actions as the ones I was associated with in
Guatemala but magnified many fold in scale and scope. Simply
put, we are coordinating the world’s efforts to set
up the workings of a state, virtually from scratch. It is
worth noting that similar actions were taken in East Timor,
but not with nearly the political complexities associated
with over 700 years of Serbian-Albanian cultural tensions
pushing and pulling all manner of decision-making.
These days, it seems as if it is the role of the United
Nations to undertake impossible (or nearly impossible) missions.
For the men and women of the organization, it can be dangerous—hundreds
have died in the course of service. More often than not,
our “plum posts” are the pits. The amazing thing
is that there are thousands of dedicated professionals and
technicians ready and willing to blanket the globe in pursuit
of the U.N.’s noble purpose, as outlined in the organization’s
charter. The motivation is compelling, the will strong and
the experience enriching.
So as we watch coverage from Washington, London, Paris,
Baghdad and New York, let’s keep in mind that the United
Nations’ “rubber hits the road” in the field—often
far removed from cameras, reporters and commentators.
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