Professor Vickie Langohr
326 Fenwick/ 793-2763
Vlangohr@holycross.edu
The term "democratization" refers to the process of transforming an authoritarian political system - one in which leaders are not chosen in free and fair elections and in which rights to engage in political activity and form associations are severely limited - to a democratic political system in which citizens can hold political leaders accountable through regular, fair elections and political and civil rights are broadly protected. As leaders and citizens in many countries in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Africa have tried to transform their authoritarian regimes into democracies over the last three decades, the study of democratization has become one of the most active areas in the field of comparative politics. Questions central to the study of democratization - can any country, regardless of its history, become democratic, and are certain cultures inherently anti-democratic? - have become very prominent in recent American political debates as they pertain to the Arab world, particularly Iraq .
In the first section of this course we will examine the question of whether there are any prerequisites to democracy - factors without which creating a democracy is impossible. Is a certain level of economic and social development- for example, an industrialized economy in which only a small portion of the population works in agriculture, or in which a certain percentage of people are literate - necessary for democracy? Does democracy require certain cultural and religious norms - for example, trust in one" fellow citizens, a propensity to join voluntary associations, or a belief that religion should be limited to the sphere of individual belief and not be promoted by the government? We will then examine a particularly influential understanding of democratization that evolved beginning in the mid-1980s with regard to Latin American democratization, which argues that it is elites' decisions to pursue democracy through negotiations with one another, rather than the existence of particular prerequisites, that are key for democratization. This section will conclude with an examination of the major ways of "doing" democracy. Once a country embarks on a transition from an authoritarian to a democratic regime, it needs to decide whether it should adopt a presidential or parliamentary form of government and, in most cases, a plurality or proportional representation electoral system. We will examine some theoretical arguments in favor of, and against, each of these ways of creating a democracy, and then see how successful they were in the empirical cases in the second section of the course.
After concluding the more theoretical first section of the course, we will turn to the cases of three attempts at democratization - one which has successfully completed its first decade as a democracy (South Africa), one which had its second democratic election this summer but which still possesses many authoritarian features (Indonesia), and one which has been notably unsuccessful in several transition attempts (Nigeria). We will use these countries to test the relevance and predictive capacity of the theories that we studied in the first section of the course; you will combine the theories with the experiences of these three countries to write a final paper assessing the possibilities of democratizing Iraq. South Africa , Nigeria, and Indonesia have been chosen in large part because each brings up important questions relevant to the experience of Iraq . In each country racial or ethnic divisions, and debates about how economic resources should be divided among racial, ethnic, or religious groups, has been a major bone of contention in democratization attempts, as they are in Iraq . These three comparison countries also give us the chance to examine other questions which will be centrally involved in the success of any Iraqi transition to democracy:
Your grade will be determined by your participation in class discussion (15%) and your performance on a midterm (15%), a five-seven page paper (20%), a 12-15 page paper (25%), and a final (25%). Most reading assignments on the syllabus are followed by one or more questions which you should be able to answer after reading that material. On the day on which we are discussing those readings you should come to class able to answer those questions. Your discussion grade will be a combination of your general participation in class discussion and your ability to answer these questions in class - I will call on people to answer them if this is necessary to include every student.
The following books are available for purchase in the Holy Cross Bookstore:
In addition to these books there are also many reserve readings. All readings are available on electronic reserves (noted ER in the syllabus.) They can be accessed by going to the Holy Cross web page, clicking on "library," and then clicking on ":electronic reserves." Click either my name from the professor list or the course name from the course list and enter the password, which I will give you in class.
I EXPECT YOU TO HAVE DONE THE READING LISTED FOR EACH DATE ON THE SYLLABUS BEFORE CLASS MEETS ON THAT DATE.
How To Reach Me
My office hours will be Mondays 10-11 a.m, Tuesdays 3:30-5:00 p.m., and Thursdays 9-10 a.m. Come! If you can't make it at any of these times, feel free to set up an appointment with me. If you need to contact me between classes, the best way to do so is by email.
PART I: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
M Sept 6 & T Sept 7: Is A Certain Level of Economic Development A Prerequisite, A Requisite, Positively Correlated with, or Largely Unrelated to Democracy?
Questions: How does Lipset define economic development? Does he believe that economic development causes democracy? What are the specific causal relationships that he finds between the two?
Questions: Are Przeworski and Limongi's "modernization" the same thing as Lipset's "economic development" - are they measuring the same things? What specifically do P and L see as the connection between wealth and democracy?
Question: Do Karatnycky's findings about the connection between wealth and democracy "fit" with Przeworski and Limongi's?
Th Sept 9, M Sept 13, T Sept 14: Are Certain Cultural Norms a Prerequisite for Democracy?
Questions: Inglehardt and Norris, and Fish, each believe that there is a level of discrimination against women - and in the case of I and N, a level of intolerance toward unpopular sexual and social practices- that may well prevent Muslim countries from becoming democracies. What types of evidence does each set of authors use to make his/her point? Which evidence seems most reliable to you?
How specifically does Fish believe that discrimination against women in Muslim-majority countries hinders these countries' democratization?
Questions: While Ottaway agrees that Arab women face significant discrimination, what evidence does she use to make this argument? Is it the same as Fish's evidence? Does she "buy" Fish's argument that significant improvements in women's rights would be necessary before Arab countries could become democratic?
Questions: What does Rustow mean when he distinguishes between a "functional" and a "genetic" approach to figuring out which countries will become democratic? How does he define national unity?
T Sept 21: The Rules of The Game I: Parliamentary vs. Presidential Systems
Th Sept 23: The Rules of The Game II: Electoral Systems: Plurality vs. Proportional Representation
SECTION II: CASE STUDIES
Nigeria
M Sept 27, T Sept 28: Military Coups and Four Republics
Questions: Larry Diamond notes that the military coups which ended democracy in the First Republic (in 1966) and the Second Republic (1983) were widely welcomed by the populace. Maier quotes Babangida, who came to power through a military coup in 1985, as explaining the timing of military coups in this way:
"you see, we are very smart people. We don't intervene when we know the climate is not good for it or the public will not welcome it. We wait until there is frustration in the society. In all the coups, you find there has always been one frustration or the other. Any time there is frustration we step in. And then there is a demonstration welcoming the redeemers" (p. 59)
Why were many Nigerians pleased with the 1966 and 1983 coups?
------------------------------THURSDAY SEPT 30: MIDTERM--------------------------------
M Oct 4, T Oct 5: The Nature of the Oil "Curse"
Question : Ross examines several hypotheses which attempt to link being a rentier state and authoritarian rule, but he finds that only a few are supported by his evidence. Which ones?
Questions: It is generally argued that countries whose economies are heavily dependent on the export of a single natural resource are highly vulnerable, particularly because of swings in demand and prices for their exportable resource. However, as Karl points out, dependence on some natural resources that provide much less money than oil actually tend to create a more diversified and developed economy than those that are oil-dependent. On p. 52 she contrasts the situation of a coffee exporter with that of an oil exporter; why does she say that the coffee exporter would develop the more industrialized and diversified economy? In other words, why might oil, one of the highest-priced and heavily-demanded exportable resources, do less to develop a modern economy than less profitable agricultural exports?
On pp. 60-62, Karl argues that the way in which European states historically developed their ability to control their societies differs substantially from the way in which post-colonial petro-states ( Nigeria , Indonesia ) developed theirs. How does she argue that European states developed the ability to tax their populations; why didn’t the petro-states similarly develop theirs? How does she believe that the economics and politics of the petro-states have been negatively affected by their inability to tax their citizens?
Th Oct 7 & Th Oct 14: Federalism & Natural Resources
Questions : As Terry Karl points out, one of the most distinctive characteristics of a petro-state is that oil revenue, which accounts for an enormous proportion of overall government revenue, goes directly to the national government. This makes the question of how the national government redistributes money to the rest of the country - in the case of Nigeria , to individual states and localities - an intensely politicized issue. Has the percentage of revenue collected by/redistributed to Nigerian states, as opposed to the central government, increased or decreased since 1954? Have states generally received a greater share of revenues in periods of democratic or military rule? What is the situation today?
------------------- COLUMBUS DAY BREAK: MON OCT 11 & T OCT 12------------------------
Question: What was the position of the Ogoni, who live in the Eastern region, vis-à-vis the rest of the Easterners, particularly during the Biafran war? How did both Ken Saro-Wiwa and his comrades - later enemies - within MOSOP deal with democratic and military governments in Nigeria to achieve their aims, and were the eventual divisions between Saro-Wiwa and others in MOSOP primarily caused by a difference in their ways of achieving those aims?
M Oct 18: The Actors and Some Key Political Issues in Suharto's Indonesia
T Oct 19, Th Oct 21, M Oct 25: The Intertwining of Corruption, Economic Growth, and Human Rights Abuses in Suharto" Indonesia: the 1970s to the Present
Question: As Crouch describes it on page 572, patrimonial rulers remain in power primarily by "satisfying the aspirations - especially the material interests" of elites, who support the ruler in exchange for material gain. He says this type of system can only persevere as long as certain conditions are met: what are they? Why does he argue that the Suharto regime was in a much better position to use patrimonial means to stay in power than Sukarno had been? Why did he predict that in the future Suharto would be less able to rely on patrimonialism, and more dependent on overt repression, in order to stay in power?
T Oct 26: The Mechanics of the Transition
Th Oct 28: The Role of Islam in A Democratic Indonesia?
Questions: Mujani and Liddle note (109-110) the "long-held near-consensus among specialists that the vast majority of Indonesian Muslims are steadily moderate in their political views," and contend that only 14% of those involved in their poll are "strong or even moderate Islamists" (110). In looking at the polling percentages on page 114:
a) Do the survey results seem to you to support Mujani and Liddle's thesis?
b) Do there seem to be inconsistencies between people's answers to different questions? Which ones?
c) In the beginning of the semester we read Norris and Inglehart's argument that support for women's equality - as expressed in the answers to polling questions similar to those used here - is essential to democracy. Which of the 14 questions used here would they find important to predicting Indonesia's success as a democracy, and how would they interpret the results?
Iraq
M Nov 1, T Nov 2, Th Nov 4, M Nov 8, T Nov 9, Th Nov 11: A Basic History of Iraqi Politics
----------------------TUESDAY NOVEMBER 9 - PAPER ONE DUE-----------------------------
South Africa: Dismantling Apartheid, Continuing Poverty, and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
M Nov 15, T Nov 16, Th Nov 18: One Interpretation of the Transition: Elite Negotiations Ended Apartheid
NO CLASS M NOV 22 and T NOV 23
-----------------------THANKSGIVING BREAK: WED NOV 24 - SUN NOV 28------------------
M Nov 29, T Nov 30: Another Interpretation of the Transition: Grassroots Mobilization Ended Apartheid
Question: What does Wood mean when she says that South Africa " economy under apartheid was based upon "extra-economic coercion" of labor? How does this she believe that this differs from a normal market economy, and what specific apartheid policies would she single out as part of this "extra-economic coercion"? How is this economic coercion related to the nonoverlapping white and African distributions of income pictured on p. 124?
Th Dec 2, Mon Dec 6: Should Those Responsible (Who Are They?) for Apartheid Be Punished? Who is Responsible for Apartheid" Enduring Economic Legacy?
a) In his story about the city council in Cape Town on which Adelaide Buso sits, Goodman highlights the unexpected fact that in the 1994 post-apartheid elections the National Party - the architect of apartheid - won most of the seats on the council, and indeed in the province of the Western Cape as a whole. In a province which is only 25% white, how did the National Party win these post-apartheid elections?
b) Why have so many poor South African blacks, first during apartheid and then after the 1994 transition, been unable to keep the members of their families living together in the same geographic area for most of the year? Do the reasons for this situation today date back to policies adopted during apartheid, or are they something new?
c) In discussing the continued poverty of many blacks in South Africa , Goodman is highly critical of the policies of the ANC government since 1994. What does he think it could/should have done differently; do his ideas seem feasible to you?
T Dec 7: Last Day of Class
-------------------TUESDAY DECEMBER 7: IRAQ PAPER DUE IN CLASS-------------------------
FINAL: FRIDAY DECEMBER 17, 8:30 a.m.